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The “morality system,” Bernard Williams concludes at the end of Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy, is “a deeply rooted and still powerful misconception of life” 
(2011, 218). It combines special conceptions of value, motivation, obligation, 
practical necessity, responsibility, voluntariness, blame, and guilt. But any attempt 
to characterize the morality system runs the risk of degenerating into a laundry list 
of things that Williams happened to dislike. To see what holds the system together, 
we have to take a view of it that is sympathetic enough to recognize what this deeply 
rooted misconception is rooted in: what human concerns does it answer to, and 
where do the ideas it draws on themselves come from? If Williams calls it a “system,” 
it is because there are reasons for just those ideas to come together in just that way. 
Once we see the point of the system, we will be in a better position to see what is 
wrong with it, and why “we would be better oﬀ without it” (2011, 193). 
 In order better to grasp the point of the system and why it combines the ideas it 
does in the way it does, I propose to reconstruct the morality system from the 
ground up: to ask not just why the system is as it is, but also why the ideas and 
practices it harnesses are there to be harnessed in the ﬁrst place. This is a question 
that Williams returns to throughout his work, and that, in his 1993 preface to 
Morality (originally published in 1972), he highlights as having been central already 
to that ﬁrst book (2001, xiii). Of course, drawing on remarks from different periods 
in a philosopher’s oeuvre carries the risk of projecting more unity than is really 
there. But equally, there can be value in tentatively reconstructing an overarching 
set of concerns that would exhibit connections between and motivate a 
philosopher’s continual engagement with certain issues—especially when that 
oeuvre is widely perceived as lacking unity. In this spirit, I will try to show that 
Williams’s oeuvre presents us with vindicatory explanations of the system’s building 
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blocks that are explanatorily prior to, and importantly undergird, his criticism of the 
particular forms that these building blocks assume within the system. When 
Williams remarks that we would be better oﬀ without the system, he does not mean 
that we should completely jettison the conceptual material it draws on. His aim is 
the more constructive one of making “some sense of the ethical as opposed to 
throwing out the whole thing because we can’t have an idealized version of it” (2009, 
203). 
 By juxtaposing Williams’s vindicatory explanations with his critique of the ideas 
making up the morality system, I aim to reveal the connections between them; in 
particular, I shall argue that understanding what these ideas do for us when they are 
not in the service of the system is just as important to leading us out of the system 
as the critique of that system, because it oﬀers us an alternative and more reﬂectively 
stable way of making sense of them in vindicatory terms: it oﬀers us vindicatory 
explanations of why we came to live by these ideas that strengthen our conﬁdence in 
those ideas and the reasons we take to justify their application, because they suggest 
that these ideas are not just products of deception or holdovers from the enchanted 
world, but ideas that it makes sense for us to cultivate given our needs and concerns.1 
 It is crucial to Williams’s critique that the system’s “idealized version” of the 
ethical is not just a philosophers’ fantasy that does little harm outside the seminar 
room, but “the outlook, or, incoherently, part of the outlook, of almost all of us” 
(2011, 194). It is incoherently part of our outlook because we also have, alongside the 
system’s rareﬁed conceptions of moral value, obligation, voluntariness, and blame, 
more everyday conceptions of these things, and much of the time, it is these more 
relaxed conceptions that we act on. Hence, when we talk simply of “our concepts” in 
the coarse-grained way that ignores ﬁner distinctions between diﬀerent conceptions 
of the same thing, there is an important sense in which “our concepts” are not those 
of the system. This explains how Williams can say that “[w]e have fooled ourselves 
into believing that we have a more puriﬁed notion of moral responsibility than we 
have” (1999a, 163), or why he feels drawn to the distinction between what we think 
and what we merely think that we think (1993, 7, 91). But as this formulation itself 
brings out, the boundary between what we think and what we think that we think 
cannot ultimately be a sharp one: even what we merely think that we think will often 
 
1 I elaborate on the idea of vindicatory explanation in Queloz (Forthcoming). 
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have very real eﬀects—not just on what else we think, but on how we end up living. 
The morality system may be an unrealizable vision, but it is not for all that unreal. It 
is the real problem of an unrealizable vision. 
 To understand how the system’s conceptions and our more everyday conceptions 
can be seen as conceptions of the same things at all, and how they relate to each 
other, Williams approaches them in light of a tertium quid: maximally generic 
conceptions of ideas and practices that are schematic, underdetermined, and 
probably ﬁctional, but that nevertheless present us with helpful models of the 
conceptual practices we really do ﬁnd in human societies. For Williams, the point 
of considering these prototypes lies in identifying defeasible reasons to think that 
any society will develop conceptual practices along these lines, because these answer 
to needs of a very basic sort. To keep track of which of these three conceptions of a 
given conceptual practice is at issue, I shall use the subscript (GEN) to mark the generic 
conceptions that are too underspeciﬁed to be situated in space or time; (UND) to mark 
the undemanding conceptions we actually live by a lot of the time; and (MS) to mark 
the morality system’s more demanding conceptions. 
 My argument falls into three parts. The ﬁrst (§1) considers vindicatory 
explanations, in terms of generic needs, of what will turn out to be the four crucial 
building blocks of the morality system: the moral/non-moral distinction(GEN), the 
idea of obligation(GEN), the voluntary/involuntary distinction(GEN), and the practice of 
blame(GEN).2 This part performs a double function: it explains why these conceptual 
practices are there to be harnessed by the system in the ﬁrst place, and it oﬀers us a 
way of making sense of them that is independent of the system. The second part (§2) 
is a vindicatory explanation, relative to the need for ultimate fairness, of the way in 
which the system combines and reﬁnes these building blocks into the moral/non-
moral distinction(MS), the idea of obligation(MS), the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction(MS), and the practice of blame(MS) in order to provide a shelter from luck. 
 
2 A fuller treatment than I have room for here might add guilt, which Williams contrasts in particular 
with shame (1993, 1997), and which he describes as “the characteristic ﬁrst-personal reaction within 
the system” (2011, 197). The combination I repeatedly explore here, of a vindication of the generic 
form of X with a critique of the reﬁned form it takes within the system, can be found also in Williams’s 
treatment of guilt. In its generic form, guilt helpfully “turns our attention to the victims of what we 
have wrongly done” (1993, 222). But this virtue is lost once the conception of guilt is elaborated into 
something more abstract in the morality system. 
  4 of 29 
 
Reconstructing the system in light of this organizing ambition gives us a good grasp 
on why it has the shape it has, and what the diﬀerent components of the system 
contribute. The third part (§3) is a critique of the resulting construction: I argue that 
on Williams’s view, the ultimate problem with the system is its frictionless purity. It 
robs valuable concepts of their grip on the world we live in, and, by insisting on 
purity from contingency, threatens to issue in nihilism about value and scepticism 
about agency. To overcome these problems, it is not enough to accept that 
contingency pervades human life. We also need to revise our understanding of what 
the fact of contingency entails. In particular, we need to abandon the purist attitude 
that blinds us to alternative ways of making sense of human values and agency—
alternatives that naturalistic but vindicatory explanations can provide. 
 
1. Vindicatory Explanations of Four Building Blocks of the Morality System 
1.1. The Moral/Non-Moral Distinction 
Let us begin with what is arguably the most basic building block of the morality 
system: the moral/non-moral distinction(GEN). Critical as Williams may be of the 
particular form which the distinction between the moral and the non-moral takes 
within the morality system, he still has a vindicatory story to tell about our need to 
draw some distinction along those lines. One of the aims of his 1972 book Morality, 
Williams declared in the preface he added in 1993, was the “placing of morality in 
relation to other ethical considerations and to the rest of life” (2001, xiv). The book 
achieves this, notably, by examining “what the distinction between the ‘moral’ and 
the ‘nonmoral’ is supposed to do for us” (2001, xiii). Not yet observing the 
distinction he later came to draw between the “moral” as construed by the morality 
system and the broader notion of the “ethical,” his 1972 enquiry concerns the 
moral/non-moral distinction(GEN), of which the moral/non-moral distinction(MS) is a 
particular socio-historical elaboration. 
 Williams suggests that the moral/non-moral distinction(GEN) is one we should 
expect to ﬁnd in any human society. It may be possible for an individual to live 
outside the ethical life, but no community can get by without some minimal ethical 
consciousness which stakes claims against self-interest.3 To stake claims against self-
 
3 See Williams (2011, 32, 51). 
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interest, Williams contends, is “one basic and universal function of morality” (1973b, 
250). Any morality, in order to count as a morality at all, needs to involve some 
distinction between actions which only minister to the interests of the agent and 
actions which take the interests of others into account (2001, 66). In its most 
primitive form, the concept of the moral marks a distinction between these two 
kinds of action and selects the latter for approval. 
 Of course, this primitive distinction between two classes of actions is still too 
primitive; if we are to make sense of anything like our concept of the moral, we need 
to understand why it involves discriminating not just between diﬀerent kinds of 
action, but also between diﬀerent kinds of motivation. The explanation that Williams 
gives turns on the example of “a self-interested business man who writes a cheque 
to famine relief ” (2001, 66), thus doing a good thing, but whose concern is for his 
own reputation rather than for the relief of famine. “What,” Williams asks, “is the 
point and content of saying that we do not morally approve of the self-interested 
donor to charity, or that, though he does a good thing, he does not act morally?” 
(2001, 67). Why reﬁne the moral/non-moral distinction far enough to discriminate 
not just between actions, but also between the motives from which they spring? 
 The answer, Williams suggests, is that we have reason to discriminate not just 
between self-interested and non-self-interested actions, but also between (a) non-
self-interested actions done out of self-interested motives, and (b) non-self-
interested actions done out of non-self-interested motives. Giving money to charity 
out of  concern for one’s reputation is still better than a self-interested action—the 
self-interested donor will, after all, help relieve famine, and this is surely “better than 
that another combined cocktail cabinet and TV set should be bought” (2001, 66). 
Yet there is still “a very good point” (2001, 67) in withholding moral approval in the 
case of the self-interested donor and reserving it for cases of type (b). While cases of 
type (a) only yield non-self-interested actions when these happen to align with the 
agent’s self-interest, the motivations in cases of type (b) are steadier because they are 
general dispositions to do things of the non-self-interested sort: motivations 
grounded in principle, as a Kantian emphasis would have it, or in sympathy with 
others, as a Humean emphasis would have it. “This must surely,” Williams remarks, 
“have something to do with the point of selecting certain motives for moral 
approbation: we are concerned to have people who have a general tendency to be 
prepared to consider other people’s interests on the same footing as their own” (2001, 
  6 of 29 
 
68).4 
 The point of having a concept of the moral that ties moral action to moral motive, 
then, is to select for moral approval “general dispositions to do things of the non-
self-interested sort” (2001, 69–70). So far, this is a vindicatory story. We get a 
vindicatory explanation, ﬁrst, of why any community would need to draw some kind 
of distinction between moral and non-moral actions, and then of why this 
distinction would need to be focused further to make a moral action one that stems 
from a certain kind of motive. 
 
1.2 The Idea of Obligation 
Another crucial source material for the morality system that Williams aims to 
achieve an independent grip on is the idea of obligation(GEN). Why do we have it in 
the ﬁrst place? Williams goes some way towards oﬀering an explanation that might 
“help us to understand the point and value of living a life in which obligations 
counted as ethical reasons” (2006e, 73). 
 The idea of obligation(GEN) (along with its correlate, the idea that those towards 
whom one has an obligation have a right)5 is grounded in the basic interest of human 
beings everywhere in being able to rely on certain things—e.g., that they will not be 
killed, assaulted, or arbitrarily expropriated (2011, 205). The idea of obligation(GEN) 
works to secure reliability by helping to create “a state of aﬀairs in which people can 
reasonably expect others to behave in some ways and not in others” (2011, 208). In 
particular, it works to ensure that considerations of importance are given high 
deliberative priority. This, according to Williams, is the most basic point of the idea 
of obligation(GEN). A consideration enjoys such priority for us if, ﬁrst, it appears in 
our deliberations, and second, it is given heavy weighting against other 
considerations (2011, 203). The concept of obligation(GEN) is like the special email 
format which ensures that important emails are ﬂagged as “high priority” when they 
appear in the recipient’s inbox: it provides a format for ethical considerations that 
lends them particular prominence and weight in people’s deliberations. 
 Using the idea of obligation, we can try to make sure that considerations of basic 
 
4 There is a parallel here to Kitcher’s (2011) claim that the most basic point of morality is to remedy 
“altruism failures.” See also Williams (1980).  
5 See Williams (2011, 206). 
  7 of 29 
 
and standing importance are reﬂected in “settled and permanent pattern[s] of 
deliberative priorities” (2011, 206). But obligations can also be more context-
sensitive. If the person next to me suﬀers a stroke, a “general ethical recognition of 
people’s vital interests” becomes “focused into a deliberative priority by immediacy” 
(2011, 206). Immediacy to me generates an obligation for me to help. Even more 
conditional are obligations generated by promises. The institution of promising 
“operates to provide portable reliability,” as Williams puts it, “oﬀering a formula that 
will confer high deliberative priority on what might otherwise not receive it” (2011, 
207–208). 
 In light of this, it is not altogether surprising that the morality system should have 
grown around the notion of obligation rather than around some other category of 
ethical thought. If Williams is right, the notion of obligation is a device which 
originally serves to acknowledge and reﬂect, at the level of deliberation, the 
overriding urgency and demandingness of our most basic needs and our needs in 
situations of emergency. These practical origins explain why the device is so 
demanding—it is “just because the needs involved are so elementary that the 
psychological mechanisms designed to meet those needs are demanding” (1995g, 
205). Yet it is also “because those mechanisms are demanding that the theory which 
grows around them becomes so dense and oppressive” (1995g, 205). Taken beyond 
its proper remit, the device of obligation soon seems absurdly overpowered, rather 
like a Roman dictator who retains his emergency powers beyond the fulﬁlment of 
his mandate. 
 
1.3 The Voluntary/Involuntary Distinction 
The third crucial building block is the voluntary/involuntary distinction(GEN). 
Williams thinks that it can be constructed already out of distinctions that humans 
everywhere are bound to ﬁnd worth having. “All conceptions of responsibility make 
some discriminations” (1993, 66) between what is voluntary and what is not. Though  
“no conception of responsibility conﬁnes response entirely to the voluntary” (1993, 
66), the voluntary/involuntary distinction, and the concomitant notion of “the will” 
in a correspondingly unambitious sense, are universally worth having. 
 His idea is that the need for the voluntary/involuntary distinction(GEN) grows out 
of the need for some practice of recognizing responsibility(GEN). Already in his essay 
for the BBC’s Third Programme, Williams observes that this is a practice which the 
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Greeks shared with us in some form (1963, 1–2). Like us, they recognized that to be 
responsible for a state of aﬀairs is not just a matter of being the cause of it through 
some bodily movement. To determine whether someone carries responsibility for 
that state of aﬀairs in the full sense which makes them a proper subject of blame, we 
want to know more about the bodily movement. Was it just a nervous twitch, or did 
they really act? Did they intend to bring about that state of aﬀairs? And what state of 
mind were they in when they did so? In Shame and Necessity, Williams spells out 
four “basic elements of any conception of responsibility” (1993, 55): 
Cause: the idea that someone brought about a bad state of aﬀairs in virtue of what they 
did; 
Intention: the idea that they intended that state of aﬀairs; 
State: the idea that they were in a normal state of mind when they brought it about (i.e. 
not sleepwalking or subject to extreme incident passions); 
Response: the idea that this calls for some response on their part, that they need to make 
up for it. 
Out of these four basic elements, a great many diﬀerent conceptions of responsibility 
can and have been constructed by interpreting the elements in diﬀerent ways and 
varying the emphasis between them. These are “universal materials” (1993, 56), 
because the need for them follows “simply from universal banalities” (1993, 55). 
 It may be plausible enough that the ideas of Cause and Response are universal, 
but why should we expect the ideas of Intention and State to be universal? Williams’s 
answer is that we are bound to be interested in drawing distinctions between what 
is intended or done in a normal state of mind and what is not, because these 
distinctions are crucial to understanding how an action relates to an agent’s plans 
and character. Williams gives an example from the Odyssey, where Odysseus and 
Telemachus confront Penelope’s suitors and ﬁnd, to their great alarm, that the suitors 
are handing out the weapons that Telemachus was supposed to have hidden in a 
storeroom. Odysseus angrily wonders who opened the storeroom, and Telemachus 
explains that it was his mistake, and that no one else is to blame—he left the door of 
the storeroom ajar, and one of the suitors must have been a better observer than he 
was (1993, 50). Telemachus is clearly drawing a distinction here between aspects of 
what he did that were intentional and aspects that were unintentional: it was he who 
left the door ajar, but he did not mean to. This, Williams contends, shows that 
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although Homer had no direct equivalent for the word “intention,” he nevertheless 
had the concept of intention—not because we are disposed to draw on this concept 
in describing the situation, but because Homer and his characters themselves make 
distinctions which can only be understood in terms of that concept (1993, 50–51). 
For Williams, it is no surprise that they draw such distinctions: “it must be a possible 
question how the intentions and actions of an agent at a given time ﬁt in with, or fail 
to ﬁt in with, his intentions and actions at other times,” he writes, because “under 
any social circumstances at all, that is a question for other people who have to live 
with him” (1993, 56). Being sensitive to which aspects of an action are intentional 
helps us understand what kind of action it is, and what else to expect from someone 
who, in that situation, intends those things. If Telemachus had intentionally left the 
door ajar, this would have disquieting implications for Odysseus, suggesting that 
Telemachus was not, after all, on his side. Here, the question whether Telemachus 
meant to do what he did is a matter of life and death. 
 Similarly, we are bound to care whether actions are done from a normal state of 
mind, because this is crucial to ﬁguring out what to expect from people: if someone 
acts intentionally but in a strange state of mind, we know that their actions probably 
do not stand in a regular relation to their plans and character. Williams gives the 
example of Agamemnon, who took Briseis from Achilles, and did so intentionally, 
but in a strange state of mind: the gods cast ate (delusion) on his wits, so that he was 
in a state of blind madness (1993, 52). Being sensitive to the state of mind from which 
people act helps us see how their intention and action on one occasion ﬁts into the 
broader pattern of their intentions and actions on other occasions. It helps us 
separate the exceptional from the expectable. Like the capacity to separate the 
intentional from the unintentional, this is a capacity that people living together are 
bound to have an interest in possessing. 
 This brings us to the key point for our purposes, namely that if the notions of 
Cause, Intention, State, and Response are available, one already has all the material 
necessary to construct the notion of the voluntary(GEN). It earns its keep in virtue of 
the need to recognize responsibility for certain actions and to understand the place 
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of intentions and actions in people’s plans and characters. 6  The notion of the 
voluntary(GEN) picks out all those actions we are left with once we have ﬁltered out 
things done unintentionally or in an abnormal state of mind: “a certain thing is done 
voluntarily if (very roughly) it is an intentional aspect of an action done in a normal 
state of mind” (1993, 66). Williams sees a similar notion at work today. Speaking 
about our present-day version of the voluntary/involuntary distinction(UND), he 
writes: “‘A does X voluntarily’ is equivalent to ‘A does X intentionally in a normal 
state of mind’” (2006a, 120).7 
 These notions of the voluntary—voluntary(GEN) and voluntary(UND)—may strike 
one as superﬁcial: push beyond a certain point such questions as what exactly 
someone intends, what makes it true that they intend it, and whether they intended 
to become the kind of person who can intend such a thing, and this notion of the 
voluntary gives out. But for Williams, its superﬁciality is precisely what makes it 
worth having: “if voluntariness is to do its work such questions cannot be pressed 
beyond a certain point” (2006a, 124); it is “an essentially superﬁcial notion, which 
works on condition that one does not try to deepen it” (1995i, 495). A useful notion 
of the voluntary is one that helps us capture such obviously important diﬀerences as 
that between intentionally turning on the stove and somnambulism. Distinctions at 
this superﬁcial level do nothing to settle the problem of free will (nor, indeed, do 
they generate that problem in the ﬁrst place).8 But it is by doing work at this level 
that the notion of the voluntary helps us to live. It is (in Nietzsche’s phrase which 
Williams quotes more than once) superﬁcial out of profundity.9 
 
6 Williams puts it even more strongly in a footnote to “Moral Luck: A Postscript”: “the idea of the 
voluntary … is inherent in the concept of action” (1995e, 247 n. 4). See also Williams (2002, 45, 1995c, 
1995f, 1999a; Magee and Williams 1971). 
7 Another formula he uses is: “an agent does X fully voluntarily if X-ing is an intentional aspect of an 
action he does, which has no inherent or deliberative defect” (1995h, 25). 
8 See Williams (1993, 67–68): “It is a mistake to suppose that the notion of the voluntary is a profound 
conception that is threatened only by some opposing and profound theory about the universe (in 
particular, to the eﬀect that determinism is true). That supposition underlies the traditional 
metaphysical problem of the freedom of the will … there is a problem of free will only for those who 
think that the notion of the voluntary can be metaphysically deepened.” 
9 Nietzsche himself uses the phrase more than once (2001, Preface, §4, 2005, Epilogue, §2). For 
further discussion of the superﬁciality of the notion of the voluntary, see Williams (1993, 67–68, 
1995b, 127–128, 1995e, 243, 1995i, 495–496, 2006a, 124–125). 
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1.4 The Practice of Blame 
The last building block I want to examine, which also grows out of the practice of 
recognizing responsibility, is the practice of blame(GEN). Here also, Williams’s critique 
of blame(MS) is rooted in a more charitable account of blame(GEN), an account which 
presents blame(GEN) as a valuable, if peculiar, “instrument of social control” (1995c, 
15). It is an instrument of social control because it helps sustain communities by 
inducting new individuals (including notably children) into a shared ethical 
sensibility, and secure some degree of realignment with that sensibility where 
individuals problematically deviate from it. It is a peculiar instrument, however, 
because as long as the participants in the practice of blame think of it in purely 
instrumental terms, as justiﬁed only by its eﬃcacy as a tool of alignment, blame will 
fail to produce the desired eﬀects—it will tend to produce resentment rather than 
remorse: 
Blame that is perceived as unjust often fails to have the desired results, and merely 
generates resentment. This shows that the idea of blame’s justiﬁcation is not the same as 
the idea of its eﬃcacy. When a recipient thinks that blame is unjustiﬁed, the content of 
his thought cannot be that the blame will be ineﬀective. This does not show that the 
purpose of blame may not in fact lie in the modiﬁcation of behaviour; it means only that 
if this is true, it cannot be obvious to those who are eﬀectively blamed. (1995c, 15) 
The practice of blame can be eﬃcacious only insofar as it is understood by 
participants to be more than just a regulative device, because only then will 
recipients of blame be suitably moved by the normative demands that blame 
expresses. Consequently, no account of blame that bases its justiﬁcation merely on 
its eﬃcacy can be adequate, because “it collides with one of the most obvious facts 
about blame, that in many cases it is eﬀective only if the recipient thinks that it is 
justiﬁed” (1995c, 15). 
At ﬁrst pass, the conclusion that blame cannot wear its function on its sleeve 
seems subversive, calling into doubt my claim that Williams has a vindicatory 
account of blame in its generic form. But there is another way of reading the claim 
that blame cannot wear its function on its sleeve. Taking our cue from Truth and 
Truthfulness, we can see blame as a practice exhibiting what I call self-eﬀacing 
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functionality:10 the practice of blame is functional, but only insofar as and because 
it is sustained by motives and reasons that are autonomous, i.e. not conditional on 
the practice’s functionality. As a result, the functionality of blame is eﬀaced, i.e. it is 
not the primary consideration for participants as they engage in the practice, but for 
benign functional reasons: we reap the beneﬁts of blame only if we are not beneﬁt-
minded about it.11 
 This explains why blame’s functionality is not obvious to participants, because 
that functionality itself requires them to be motivated by something other than the 
practice’s functionality; but participants can become conscious of this without 
destabilizing the practice, because not only blame, but also the practice of thinking 
of it non-instrumentally are vindicated in terms that (unlike the sort of vindication 
envisaged by indirect consequentialism) do not undermine the authority of the non-
instrumental reasons for blame. In Truth and Truthfulness, the insight into the 
functionality of thinking in non-functional terms is oﬀered as something that 
strengthens our conﬁdence in the practice.12 
 For Williams, then, the four building blocks I have focused on are not the 
invention of the morality system. Nor are they inextricably linked to each other and 
to that system in a way that would preclude our making sense of them outside the 
system. All four building blocks can be made independently intelligible, because 
they have deeper roots in independent generic needs. 
 
2. A Vindicatory Explanation of the Morality System 
With these vindicatory explanations of the building blocks in place, we can now turn 
to the system itself. To what end does it incorporate and reshape just these building 
blocks in the way it does? What concerns explain the “particular development of the 
 
10 See Queloz (2018). 
11 In Queloz (Manuscript), I elaborate on this account of blame as a self-effacingly functional practice 
and on why it really is vindicatory and reflectively stable in a way that other instrumentalist or 
consequentialist accounts of blame are not. 
12 Nor does the fact that blame sometimes over-stretches the idea that one had reason to act otherwise 
count against it, since even the ﬁction that one had reason to act otherwise has a valuable tendency 
to instil in the blamed just the sensitivity to reasons that it pretends they already possess (1995d, 41–
44). On this “proleptic” function of blame, see Fricker (2016). 
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ethical” (2011, 7) that is the morality system, and what is its point?13 
 Williams gives his most pointed answer to this question in “Moral Luck: A 
Postscript”: 
The point of this conception of morality is, in part, to provide a shelter against luck, one 
realm of value (indeed, of supreme value) that is defended against contingency. (1995e, 
241) 
Our demand for a shelter from luck grows out of a longing for “ultimate justice” 
(2011, 43) or “fairness” (1995f, 75). In the face of the fact that “most advantages and 
admired characteristics are distributed in ways that, if not unjust, are at any rate not 
just, and some people are simply luckier than others,” the morality system expresses 
“the ideal that human existence can be ultimately just,” because it oﬀers a special 
kind of value, moral value, that outshines every other kind of value and “transcends 
luck” (2011, 217).14 
 On Williams’s view, the concern that has to be factored in to get from the four 
building blocks in their generic form to the moral/non-moral distinction(MS), the 
idea of obligation(MS), the voluntary/involuntary distinction(MS), and the practice of 
blame(MS) is the longing for ultimate justice, which they serve by providing a shelter 
from luck. Is that longing for ultimate justice a more socio-historically local concern 
than the generic human needs we considered above? Williams’s position on this is 
diﬃcult to pin down. He describes the morality system as a historical phenomenon, 
connected to Platonism and Christianity, that ﬁnds its purest expression in the 
moral philosophy of Kant.15 But he is also sympathetic to the idea that the sense of 
fairness and the resentment of unfairness have deep naturalistic roots in the social 
character of our species, and might even be innate.16 
 
13 A related question is what drives the systematization of ethical thought that ultimately issues in 
ethical theory. See Cueni and Queloz (Forthcoming) for a reconstruction of Williams’s answer. 
14 Many have since highlighted the importance of fairness as a motivation for the immunisation of 
morality against luck; see Levy (2011, 9–10), Otsuka (2009, 374–75), and Sher (2005, 180). For a 
critical discussion of fairness-based arguments in favour of luck-free morality, see Hartman (2016, 
2017). 
15 See Williams (2014, 86). See Louden (2007) for an assessment of Williams’s equation of the morality 
system with Kant’s system which, barring some “subsidiary aspects,” ﬁnds it “substantially correct” 
(126–127). 
16 See Williams (1999b, 248). 
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 As Williams also writes, however, what desires we have is a function of what we 
deem possible (1973a, 147), and perhaps the thought is that while the longing 
for fairness is old, the sense that ultimate fairness is possible is not—that, roughly 
speaking, had to wait for Plato, whose development of Pythagorean ideas provided 
the required dualism of soul and body, and in particular the idea of a “featureless 
moral self ” (1993, 160).17 The Socratic dictum that “the good man cannot be harmed, 
since the only thing that could touch him would be something that could touch the 
good state of his soul” (2011, 39) articulates the animating idea of the morality 
system. It was also Plato who imposed a stark division between “rational concerns 
that aim at the good, and mere desire” (1993, 42), thereby providing the strategy of 
ethicizing psychology, as Williams calls it—the strategy of ﬁtting psychological ideas 
to moral demands instead of trying to ﬁt moral ideas into an antecedent 
understanding of human psychology. 18  Thus, while the concerns driving the 
construction of a shelter from luck may be old, the construction itself had to wait 
for suitable material to come together, for only then could the ambition to “make 
the world safe for well-disposed people” (2006f, 59) gain a foothold.19 Refracted 
through Platonic ideas, the primitive concern with fairness was elaborated and 
focused into a demand for ultimate fairness. In this “strong form,” the concern to 
resist luck is one of the “idiosyncrasies” of the “local species of the ethical” (1995e, 
242) that is the morality system. 
 Once we see the system as organized by a concern to deliver ultimate justice by 
providing a shelter from luck, we can try to reverse-engineer the distinctive 
contributions of its components and explain—in terms that will be vindicatory 
relative to the demand for ultimate justice—their elaboration into the moral/non-
moral distinction(MS), the idea of obligation(MS), the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction(MS), and the practice of blame(MS). To this end, our guiding question must 
be: How does one construct a shelter from luck? 
 First, one needs a special kind of value that is not “merely a consolation prize you 
 
17 See Williams (2006d, 16). 
18 In Williams’s terms, to ethicize psychology is “to provide a psychology that gets its signiﬁcance 
from ethical categories” (1993, 43) or to deﬁne “the functions of the mind, especially with regard to 
action … at the most basic level in terms of categories that get their signiﬁcance from ethics” (1993, 
160). See also Williams (2006b, 78). 
19 A phrase Williams used in the referenced passage to describe “the tireless aim of moral philosophy.” 
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get if you are not in worldly terms happy or talented or good-humoured or loved,” 
but the “supreme” form of value—it “has to be what ultimately matters” (2011, 217) 
if it is to eclipse any lack of luck in other respects. This is where the moral/non-moral 
distinction(GEN) comes in. In its generic form, Williams agrees with Hume, the 
distinction is not very sharp.20 But it can be elaborated into a stark distinction to 
provide a special kind of value—moral(MS) value—whose importance can be dialled 
up to the point where it drowns out any other kind of value. The supremacy of 
moral(MS) value helps shut out luck by ensuring that misfortunes along other 
dimensions do not count. The most eﬀective way of achieving this is for moral(MS) 
value to be supreme not just by carrying more weight than other kinds of value, but 
by forbidding comparison altogether. It is not that moral(MS) value ends up 
outweighing other kinds of value—there is not even a competition. This is what 
Williams refers to when he notes the tendency of the system to close in on itself, so 
that it comes to seem an “indecent misunderstanding” (2011, 217) to ask, as Nietzsche 
did, what the value of that system is.21 The system’s “purism and its self-suﬃciency 
mean that it is structured not to hear any considerations that might limit its own” 
(1995g, 204). From the point of view of the system, nothing outside the system really 
matters. 
 Second, one needs to ensure that the point of view of the system, and the 
demands it makes on us, are truly inescapable. The demands raised by the system 
therefore have to combine two aspects: ubiquity, to ensure that there is no domain 
where the demands of the system do not arise; and stringency, to ensure that these 
demands are forceful enough to take precedence over other demands. This is where 
the notion of obligation(GEN) comes in as the ideal format in which to couch moral 
thought. For reasons we considered, obligations are stringently demanding and 
designed to intrude into deliberation and impose themselves at the top of the 
priority list. Moreover, as Williams notes, “if obligation is allowed to structure 
ethical thought, there are several natural ways in which it can come to dominate life 
 
20 See Williams (1995c, 20 n. 12) and Hume (1998, Appendix IV). 
21 Nietzsche asks after “the value of morality,” urging that “we need a critique of moral values, for once 
the value of these values must itself be called into question” (1998, Preface, §§5–6). Williams strikingly 
echoes Nietzsche when he notes that “the principal aim of all moral philosophy” is that of “truthfully 
understanding what our ethical values are and how they are related to our psychology, and making, 
in the light of that understanding, a valuation of those values” (1995a, 578). 
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altogether” (2011, 202). If only an obligation can overrule an obligation, the felt need 
to resist a given obligation will invite one to look for ways in which the need to resist 
it can itself be rationalized as expressing a general obligation; and the more this 
happens, the more general obligations multiply, so that they end up providing “work 
for idle hands” (2011, 202) across all aspects of life. The notion of moral obligation(MS) 
is thus perfectly suited to the task of ensuring that the system comes as close as 
possible to being truly inescapable. The proliferation of moral obligations(MS) means 
that there is always something that one is under an obligation to do, leaving no 
sphere of life free of the system’s inﬂuence; and the stringency of moral obligation(MS) 
ensures that what the system demands is what one really must do. The notion of 
obligation(GEN), once elaborated into the notion of obligation(MS), allows the demands 
of the morality system to become—in Kant’s term that usefully combines the two 
aspects of ubiquity and stringency (2011, 198)—categorical. 
 Our construction thus far already looks well defended against contingency. 
Insofar as agents manage to stand in the right relation to their moral obligations, 
they will be living well in the only respect that ultimately matters—insofar as they 
manage to enter the shelter, they will be safe from luck. And everywhere, the shelter 
is there to be entered, because everywhere, morality makes not just a claim on one, 
but the claim: what morality demands is what one really must do. We thus have a 
robust shelter which ubiquitously invites us in and promises to shut out the forces 
of contingency. 
 But though ubiquitous and contingency-proof, our shelter does not yet fully serve 
people’s concern to escape contingency, because it still suﬀers from an unequal access 
problem: some may ﬁnd it easier than others to align their lives with the demands 
of the system. To eliminate contingency even here, entry to the shelter needs to be 
regulated in terms that guarantee equal access. Clearly, for instance, moral value 
must not be tied up with the consequences of actions, because this would render 
agents vulnerable to luck. As a Medieval proverb has it, when the ﬂung stone leaves 
the hand, it belongs to the devil. To truly discount luck, moral value needs to retreat 
into the agent, to lie “in trying rather than succeeding, since success depends partly 
on luck” (2011, 217). Harnessing the emphasis on moral motivation which we noted 
in the moral/non-moral distinction(GEN), the system is thus driven to focus 
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exclusively on moral intentions and motives.22 
 Yet if the basis on which we allocate moral worth is to be ultimately just, we still 
need to eliminate various contingencies within the agent, because the “capacity to 
try,” or to act from moral motives, “is itself a matter of luck” (2011, 217). Various 
contingencies at the level of natural endowments, socialization, education, and other 
biographical and historical circumstances may make it easier for some to develop 
the right kind of motivation. Moral motivation must therefore itself be understood 
in terms that insist on purity from contingency. It must not be conditional on 
contingent desires or motives. It must be a form of motivation that the agent has 
anyway already—for instance, in virtue of being a rational agent.23 
 The requirement that makes itself felt here is that in order to guarantee equal 
access to the shelter from luck, the system must base itself solely on what any agent 
has complete control over no matter their circumstances. This is where the 
voluntary/involuntary distinction(GEN) comes in. Even in its generic form, it already 
does some of the work required by separating out what the agent did unintentionally 
or in an abnormal state of mind. But the “search for an intrinsically just conception 
of responsibility” (1993, 95) leads one to push responsibility even further back, to a 
puriﬁed form of trying that is not conditioned by any disposition or desire, or any 
other trait that the agent contingently has: what Williams calls “utter voluntariness” 
(2011, 218) or, following Kant, “the unconditioned will” (1981, 20). To be truly 
unconditioned, this puriﬁed conception of “the will” must not be in any way 
empirically determined by what the agent contingently is. The locus of the will in 
this demanding form cannot therefore be the socially situated and contingently 
constructed self. It has to be the featureless moral self that lies beyond all 
determination by empirical circumstances (in Kantian terms: the transcendental 
self). The intrinsically just basis on which moral responsibility(MS) is allocated in the 
system must be the unconditioned will of the characterless self. 
 Williams acknowledges that the idea of the unconditioned will also has other 
 
22 Attempts to render utilitarianism actionable issue in a notably similar structure by enjoining the 
agent to maximize expected rather than actual utility to the best of the agent’s knowledge: although 
actual utility is to a substantial degree a matter of luck, agents escape blame as long as they maximize 
expected utility (though see Monton (2019) for a discussion of exceptional cases). 
23 Williams (1984) offers an exegetical reconstruction of Kant’s version of this idea. 
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roots rendering that aspect of the system “overdetermined” (1995g, 204).24 Williams 
notes, for example, that the “phenomenology of bodily movement and the notion of 
trying” (1999a, 149) already invite, via the observation that one can will a movement 
without it actually ensuing, the distinction between the self qua locus of action and 
the self qua locus of the will. He also remarks that we want there to be something 
over which we have complete control, and we want that because we feel the need for 
“real authorship of our actions” (1999a, 149). A further driving force is the 
resentment we feel when others wrong us. Williams here takes a leaf out of 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy (1998, I, §13), which describes the idea of a featureless moral 
agent—an agent lying beyond all determination by circumstance who can will to 
actualize his contingent dispositions or not—as being motivated by the felt need to 
blame not just the nature of things in general, but those who wronged us in particular. 
Connected to this is the human tendency to indulge in a “fantasy of retrospective 
prevention” (1995f, 73), where the victim fantasizes about replacing the wrongdoer’s 
action with an acknowledgement of the victim. This fantasy again motivates 
thinking of the agent in isolation from the network of circumstances, as an 
autonomous entity capable of willing to act otherwise than the agent in fact did. 
 Lastly, the system must also allocate moral blame in a way that shields the agent 
from luck. This is easily achieved at this point, since moral blame(MS) only needs to 
track utter voluntariness to ensure that the agent is blamed only “on the ultimately 
fair basis of the agent’s own contribution” (2011, 216). This is what Williams calls the 
“puriﬁed conception of blame” (1995f, 72). By tying blame to utter voluntariness, the 
system ensures that agents are blamed “for no more and no less than what is in 
[their] power” (1995f, 72). Given the moral demands on the will(MS) to align with 
obligations(MS), the puriﬁed conception of blame ties blame(MS) to the purely voluntary 
breaking of obligations. Because the system focuses on blame(MS) at the expense of 
other reactive attitudes and links blame(MS) to the purely voluntary breaking of 
obligations, “the thought I did it has no special signiﬁcance” within the resulting 
picture of the ethical life; the only question is “whether I voluntarily did what I ought 
to have done” (2011, 196). This leads to a blinkered disregard for what Williams 
insists is an important dimension of ethical experience, namely “the distinction 
 
24 The idea has a rich history in the theory of action; see Glock (1996, “will”), Hyman (2011, 2015), 
Candlish and Damnjanovic (2013), and Queloz (2017). 
  19 of 29 
 
simply between what one has done and what one has not done” (2011, 196).25 
 The puriﬁed conception of blame comfortingly shields one from two kinds of 
blameworthiness that would otherwise render one vulnerable to luck: it shields one 
from being blamed for what one does involuntarily (this is what George Sher calls 
the “Searchlight View” (2009, chap. 1) of responsibility, on which agents are 
responsible only for those features and results of their acts of which they are aware 
when they act); and it shields one from being blamed when one does something as 
the lesser of two evils. Choices between wrong and wrong—the stuﬀ of tragedy—
lose their sting in the morality system, because if blameworthiness is tied to broken 
obligations, and if ought implies can—one can only be under an obligation to do 
what one can do—one is not blameworthy when one does something as the lesser 
of two evils. There might have been what W. D. Ross (1930) calls a prima facie 
obligation not to do what one ended up doing, but this obligation was eventually 
defeated by the consideration that the alternative would have been worse. 
 Once the practice of blame(MS) is appropriately puriﬁed to be sensitive only to 
purely voluntary acts, our moral agents longing for ultimate justice are ﬁnally home 
and dry. The only thing that ultimately matters—moral(MS) value—is now completely 
within their control, for it depends only on whether they choose, from motives they 
all equally have anyway, to align their unconditioned will with their categorical 
obligations. 
  
3. Critique of the Morality System: Frictionless Purity 
I take it that Williams is not being entirely sarcastic when he says of the quest for 
ultimate justice that has emerged as the organizing force behind the morality system 
that it expresses a “moving” (2011, 217) ideal. Moreover, the system appears well-
tailored to its task. So what is wrong with it? 
 Williams ﬁnds numerous things wrong with it, and much of the criticism he 
levels at moral philosophy in general, or at Kantianism and utilitarianism in 
particular, applies also to the morality system. One line of criticism is that once our 
ethical thought has been subjected to the demands of coherence and systematicity 
to the degree required for it to become a system, that system leaves us with too few 
ethical thoughts and feelings to be true to ethical experience: like a colour ﬁlter laid 
 
25 This is one of the main points of “Moral Luck” (1981). See also Williams (2011, 43–44). 
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over the ethical landscape, it masks all but a few morally relevant features of it.26 
Another line of criticism is that the morality system alienates us from our projects 
and hence from what sustains the possibility of a meaningful life—the system leaves 
no-one in particular for me to be (2011, 78, 224). In his critique of utilitarianism, 
Williams notes that this amounts, “in the most literal sense,” to an attack on my 
“integrity” (1973a, 116–117). What he means is not that some of my actions fail to 
fit in with my character as expressed in my other actions. It is rather that the very 
connection to what makes my various actions mine threatens to be lost. My integrity 
as an agent depends on the fact that my actions can be seen as actions that flow from 
the projects and convictions with which I am most closely identified. By asking me 
to step away from these projects and do whatever the utility calculus requires, 
utilitarianism alienates me as an agent from that which allows me to see my actions 
as mine. The resulting actions lack any unifying connection to the projects and 
convictions of a particular agent. In that sense, they are no-one’s actions in 
particular. 
 Yet I believe that the ultimate problem with the morality system, for Williams, is 
its frictionless purity: it robs valuable concepts of their grip on the kind of world we 
live in, and by insisting that true value and free agency be pure of any contamination 
by contingency, threatens to issue in nihilism about value and scepticism about 
agency. This critique has two strands: the No-Friction critique and the Purist-
Attitude critique. 
 To illustrate the No-Friction critique, let us focus on blame(MS). The criticism then 
is that blame(MS) fails to recruit people into a shared ethical sensibility or to bring 
deviators back into it because it fails to get a grip on the kind of world we actually 
live in, where an agent’s character and circumstances largely lie outside that agent’s 
control. A conception of blameworthiness that tracks purely voluntary acts is 
“frictionless” or “fails to get a grip in the world we live in” insofar as its extension in 
the world we actually inhabit is empty, so that acts of the sort we do in fact encounter 
fail, upon closer scrutiny, to qualify as proper targets of blame. A conception of 
blame that is frictionless in this sense cannot properly do any work for us, for it lacks 
 
26 See Williams (2011, 130). For a valuable discussion of this point, see Krishna (2014). The idea that 
the demand for systematicity and coherence comes in degrees is explored in Cueni and Queloz 
(Forthcoming). 
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an empirical basis in the world we live in. This is a criticism we ﬁnd already in 
Williams’s “The Idea of Equality” (ﬁrst published in 1962), where he insists that “the 
concept of ‘moral agent’, and the concepts allied to it such as that of responsibility, 
do and must have an empirical basis” (1973c, 235–236, emphasis mine). To be 
concepts worth having, our concepts must allow us to make discriminations within 
the empirical world we live in rather than only between that world and something 
beyond it. This is not the case with blame(MS) and its attendant conception of 
voluntary(MS) action. To be voluntary(MS), actions must not reﬂect anything that 
agents involuntarily and contingently are; but this means that actions can only be 
voluntary(MS) insofar as agents chose all the circumstances that shape their lives. 
Needless to say, hardly any action will pass this test. We did not choose our 
circumstances, or if we did, that choice was likely itself a reﬂection of prior 
circumstances we did not choose. Voluntariness cannot extend all the way back. 
Indeed, we could not have chosen our circumstances all the way through life, 
because at the beginning of this process there would have to be the pure, spirit-like 
self envisaged by the morality system, and this characterless self would lack the basis 
to make such a choice: it would be too unencumbered by commitments and 
attachments to get an adequate view of the value of anything.27 
 If, as a matter of fact, the “machinery of everyday blame” (2011, 214) does any 
work for us, this is because it “attempts less than morality would like it to do” (2011, 
215). We operate, much of the time, by the lights of blame(UND) rather than blame(MS). 
This is true more broadly: “If our modern ethical understanding does involve 
illusions, it keeps going at all only because it is supported by models of human 
behaviour that are more realistic than it acknowledges” (1993, 11). Blame(UND) works 
with a conception of voluntariness that is less demanding. In inquiring whether an 
action was voluntary in this undemanding sense, we typically seek to determine only 
whether people really acted, knew what they were doing, and intended such and such 
aspect of what they did (2011, 215–216). Many actions will meet this standard. But 
if we consistently allocated blame according to the demanding conception of 
voluntariness(MS), our blaming practices would cease to serve our need to align our 
ethical sensibilities and fail to discharge a function that we need to see discharged.  
 The No-Friction critique of the morality system is thus that the purity of blame(MS) 
 
27 See Williams (1993, 158–9, 2011, chap. 6). 
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and its concomitant ideas robs them of their much-needed friction with the 
empirical world: too puriﬁed to achieve a grip on the rough ground we live on, they 
become pointless. 
 It is tempting to conclude that there is a simple remedy: we need only learn to 
accept that the requirements of utter voluntariness cannot be met. We need more 
truthfulness and knowledge about the world we inhabit, so that we come to see that 
we are “building ethical life around an illusion” (2011, 212). 
 But there is a more insidious problem here, which brings us to the Purist-Attitude 
critique. For Williams, the problem with the morality system is not just that we fail 
to ﬁnd actions that plausibly fall under its puriﬁed conceptions; the problem is also 
that these conceptions shape our attitude towards what we do ﬁnd. The system 
encourages overblown normative expectations about what shape the world can 
properly have if value and agency are to have a place in it—the attitude that Williams 
labels its “purity” (2011, 216). This purist attitude “abstract[s] the moral 
consciousness from other kinds of emotional reaction or social inﬂuence” (2011, 216) 
and conceives of moral value as lying “beyond any empirical determination” (2011, 
217). Its purism lies in its insistence on stark contrasts between the purity of moral 
values and free agency and the natural, emotional, and social forces pervading 
human life. “In truth,” however, “almost all worthwhile human life lies between the 
extremes that morality puts before us” (2011, 216). The demands that the system’s 
conceptions make on moral motivation and voluntariness cannot in fact be met. 
“This fact,” Williams writes, 
is known to almost everyone, and it is hard to see a long future for a system committed 
to denying it. But so long as morality itself remains, there is danger in admitting the fact, 
since the system itself leaves us, as the only contrast to rational blame, forms of 
persuasion it refuses to distinguish in spirit from force and constraint. (2011, 216) 
This is where the Purist-Attitude critique proves crucial: there is danger in admitting 
to what extent contingency pervades human life as long as one remains attached to 
the morality system’s outlook, because that outlook blinds people to the forms of 
value and freedom that really are to be found in the world we live in.28 
 
28 The system “conceals” all the “options for ethical thought and experience” that there are outside 
itself—“Kantian associations constantly work to short-circuit our understanding” (1993, 77) of those 
 
  23 of 29 
 
 As a result, disenchanting our view of the world through truthful naturalistic 
enquiry risks making things worse rather than better. It risks exacerbating the sense 
that there is no room for moral value in a world thus understood, resulting in a 
nihilism that maintains that nothing has value. Moreover, because the system 
entrained an ethicized psychology reﬂected in our conceptions of free and rational 
agency as something that excludes the inﬂuence of mere desires and emotions, 
nihilism about value will be accompanied by scepticism about agency. This is why 
the system encounters the problems of free will and determinism “in a particularly 
acute form” (2011, 195). It “makes people think that, without its very special 
obligation, there is only inclination; without its utter voluntariness, there is only 
force; without its ultimately pure justice, there is no justice” (2011, 218). The result is 
a bleak and ﬂattened vision of life that elides all diﬀerence between rational 
persuasion and manipulation, convincing and coercing, the force of the better 
reason and the force of a punch in the face. This danger, which was a central concern 
of Nietzsche’s,29 and to which Williams gave pride of place in the resounding ﬁnal 
lines of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, shows that merely facing up to the world 
we live in—merely revising our beliefs—is not enough. 
 The Purist-Attitude critique is therefore this: in the face of a naturalized view of 
the world, the attitudes cultivated in us by the morality system threaten to turn us 
into sceptics or nihilists who see no room for real value or real agency. Take the 
example of blame again. Once one admits that the demand for utter voluntariness 
cannot be met, there are two ways one can go: what, drawing on the terminology 
developed on the basis of Williams’s work by Paul Russell (2017), we might call the 
pessimist would renounce the demanding conception of voluntariness in favour a 
less demanding one, and conﬁdently allocate blame on that basis; this is the exit 
from the system that Williams recommends. But it is at least equally tempting to 
reason in a diﬀerent direction and to conclude, with the sceptic, that if the demands 
of the system cannot be met, no act of blaming is ever truly justiﬁed, and all we are 
left with is people being coerced by their circumstances. 
 Note that the diﬀerence between the pessimist and the sceptic is not a diﬀerence 
 
other ways of making sense of things as valuable. This is why, from the perspective of morality, the 
“Greeks do emerge as premoral” (1993, 77). 
29 See Clark (2015) and Queloz and Cueni (2019). 
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in knowledge. They both agree that no act is ever voluntary(MS) in the way that 
blame(MS) requires. It is just that while the pessimist takes this to speak against that 
conception of blame, the sceptic takes it to speak against the hope that blame might 
ever be justiﬁed. The sceptic thereby betrays a continued adherence to the system in 
concluding that since no act is ever voluntary(MS), no acceptable form of blame is 
ever justiﬁed—in much the same way that atheists betray a residual religiosity if they 
believe, with Ivan Karamazov, that since God does not exist, everything is permitted. 
The sceptic’s position involves a counterfactual adherence to the system which is 
structurally analogous to the “counterfactual scientism” (2006c, 187) that Williams 
accuses Putnam and Rorty of: the sceptic believes that blame is in fact never justiﬁed, 
but that if it were, this would have to be due to there being utterly voluntary acts. 
 The pivotal question that separates the sceptic from the pessimist is therefore this: 
what does the fact that luck and contingency pervade human life entail? In drawing 
from it the conclusion that nothing has value and no-one is free, one betrays a 
residual commitment to the system. One betrays a commitment to the purist pattern 
of reasoning encoded in the conceptions of that system—a pattern that notably 
licenses inferences such as the following: 
If anything has value, it is the moral value of things done from moral motives. 
If an action is done from a moral motive, it is a voluntary action. 
If an action is voluntary, it is not conditioned by anything that is contingent or lies 
beyond the agent’s control. 
Via the contrapositives of those claims, one quickly gets from the realization that 
every action is somehow conditioned by things that are contingent or lie beyond the 
agent’s control to the conclusion that no action is ever voluntary and nothing has 
value. But as the diﬀerent pattern of reasoning exempliﬁed by the pessimist shows, 
one might also take the same realization to entail nothing of the sort. Drawing on 
conceptions of voluntariness, moral motivation, and value that are more tolerant of 
contingency and draw contrasts within the empirical world, one can also endorse a 
pattern of reasoning which allows us to accept that no moral motivation is ever fully 
pure of contingent desires, or no action ever fully pure of the inﬂuence of unchosen 
circumstance, and still recognize value and freedom in the world. To endorse the 
ﬁrst of these two patterns rather than the second is not to fall prey to cognitive error; 
it is to evince a bad attitude, an attitude whose badness is ethical rather than 
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cognitive. It is an attitude that does not help us to live. As Nietzsche would have put 
it, it is a life-denying attitude. 
 It emerges that the journey out of the system involves not just a ﬁrst, epistemic 
step of facing up to reality, but also a second, more radical step, of liberating oneself 
from overblown normative expectations about just how pure of contingency the 
world would have to be in order to contain things of value and responsible agents. 
The conclusion that we are left with nothing turns out to depend on an overblown 
conception of what counts as something.30 
 In light of this, emancipation from the system can be thought of as involving 
three stages.31  At the initial stage, one is still immersed in the illusion that the 
“rationalistic metaphysics of morality” (1993, 159) correspond to something in 
reality. Through truthful reﬂection and inquiry, one then moves to a transitional 
stage, where one realizes that those metaphysics do not correspond to anything, but 
retains the idea that they would have to correspond to something if the world were 
to contain true value and free agency. This entrains nihilism and scepticism. Finally, 
upon being shown that there are other ways of making sense of values and agency 
in naturalistic but nonetheless vindicatory terms, one can move out of the system 
altogether. One “resituate[s] the original opposition[s] in a new space, so that the 
real diﬀerences can emerge” between contingent desires that are moral and 
contingent desires that are not, between conditioned actions that are voluntary and 
conditioned actions that are not, and “between the force which is argument and the 
force which is not—diﬀerences such as that between listening and being hit, a 
contrast that may vanish in the seminar but which reappears sharply when you are 
hit” (2002, 9). At this third stage, one is liberated from the system’s constraining 
conceptions and capable of aﬃrming one’s values on diﬀerent grounds than before. 
There is no guarantee that all of our ideas will survive a truthful understanding of 
them, but the threat of nihilism and scepticism will have been averted if some of 
them do. (Arguably, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, with its critique of the 
“philosophical errors” (2011, 218) involved in the system, primarily helps move its 
 
30 Williams diagnoses an analogous problem in the view of some ethical theorists that if we give up 
on ethical theory, we are left with nothing (2011, 223). 
31 A comparable schema sheds light on Nietzsche’s conception of the process by which European 
morality collapses in the wake of the “Death of God.” See Queloz and Cueni (2019).  
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readers from the initial to the transitional stage, whereas Shame and Necessity and 
Truth and Truthfulness, with their naturalistic but vindicatory explanations of ideas 
of agency, responsibility, and intrinsic values like truthfulness, are more concerned 
to move their readers out of the transitional stage by giving them somewhere outside 
the system to stand.) 
 The morality system thus turns out to merit its name: it systematically harnesses 
and adapts to its own ends a variety of initially helpful ideas to hold out the 
ultimately illusory promise of a shelter from luck. Combining a vindicatory 
understanding of why we have these ideas with an initially vindicatory but 
ultimately critical understanding of why they take the form they do in the morality 
system can provide us with a nuanced sense of what we need them to do for us, and 
what kind of friction with the world they need in order to do that. But it is not 
enough simply to admit that no action is ever voluntary in the sense demanded by 
the system because contingency and luck pervade life. We also need alternative ways 
of making sense of value and agency. Only then can we really throw oﬀ the powerful 
misconceptions which, by shaping our sense of how much contingency our ideas of 
value and agency can tolerate, determine what the pervasiveness of contingency 
entails. 
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